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Can we Require Legislatures to State the
Reasons for their Legislative Decisions?
Kees Waaldijk
1. Giving reasons for legal decisions seems to be a fairly general
practice in law and a fairly general principle of law. As a princi-
ple it has been developing most notably in the field of administra-
tive law. In 1969 comparative research showed that in all countries
having a Code of Administrative Procedure this code contained some
requirement to give reasons (Wiener 1969: 787). The same research
showed that in most other countries the giving of reasons was re-
quired by special Statutes or by judge-made law for many categories
of administrative acts (1969: 789-793). An important transnational
formulation of the principle can be found in Resolution 77/31, "On
the protection of the individual in relation to the acts of the ad-
ministrative authorities", adopted on 28 September 1977 by the Com-
mittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Item IV of the Appen-
dix to this Resolution reads äs follows:
"Where an administrative act is of such nature äs adversely to
affect his rights, llberties or interests, the person concerned
i s informed of the reasons on which it is based. This is done
either by stating the reasons in the act, or by communicating
them, at his request, to the person concerned in writlng within
a reasonable time."
The Obligation to give reasons for judicial decisions has been
establlshed even stronger. See for example Article 121 of the Dutch
Constitution. In fact, judicial decisions consist of little eise
but reasons for the dictum in the last paragraph.
In general, legal decisions of private citizens need not be ac-
companied by Statements of reasons· However, various exceptions to
this rule have been created by law. See for example the duties of
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an employer who wants to terminate a contract. And in a recent case
(HR 4 June 1982, NJ 1983, nr. 32) the Dutch Supreme Court has ruled
that parents who refuse to give their minor child permlssion to
marry, have to give their reasons for this refusal, because this
refusal adversely affects a fundamental freedom of the child.
If thus the Obligation to give reasons for legal decisions is so
general that it not only binds judiclal and administrative authori-
ties, but also some private persons, what then about the position
of legislative bodies? It is clear that Statutes can adversely af-
fect rights, liberties and interests. So at least one of the ra-
tiones behind obligations to give reasons also applies to legisla-
tive bodies. Nevertheless, in most countries an Obligation for the
legislature to give reasons for its legislative decisions is nei-
ther established nor discussed äs a rule or principle of constitu-
tional law. However, it may be argued that at least in the Nether-
lands such a rule or principle is suggested by various direct and
indirect sources of law, especially by the constitutional practice
of accompanying legislative proposals with reasons.
So the question whether a legislature is required to state the
reasons for its legislative decisions is debatable in law. The
question however begs another question, which is of a less normati-
ve and more empirical and analytical character: Can we require le-
gislatures to state reasons? Giving reasons for Statutes seems more
problematic than giving reasons for judicial or administrative de-
cisions, because of the collective, political, unlimited, clustered
and continuous character of legislative decisions. It is this pro-
blematic character of (primary) legislation in relation to a possi-
ble duty to give reasons, that forms the subject matter of this pa-
per. I will try to analyse the five characteristics mentioned.
2. Statutes äs collective decisions.
In writings on the interpretation of Statutes it has frequently
been noted that all talk about "legislative Intention" is fictio-
nal, or at least problematic. One reason for that is, that most mo-
dern Western democratic "legislatures" consist of more than one bo-
dy (one or two houses of parliament, sometimes plus a separate go-
vernment) and that these legislative bodies consist of numerous in-
112
divldual members. So If a legislature were required to state "its"
reasons, difficulties would arise about whose reasons should be
stated. Sltuations in which alle members of all parts of a legisla-
ture agree about both the content and the reasons, are rare. In si-
tuations where only a majority Supports an enactment, the require-
ment to give reasons could be restricted to the reasons of that ma-
jority. These reasons could then be regarded äs the reasons of the
legislature. However, even in situations where a majority of legis-
lators concur about the content of an enactment, the reasons for
which they do so, may be different. Majority decisions may be rea-
ched on the basis of different minority reasons. Whose reasons
should then be stated äs the reasons of the legislature?
The same problem arises of course in collective courts. In some
legal Systems this problem is not permitted to appear: the court
has to produce one collective opinion. The members of the court are
forced into real or pretended consensus. In other legal Systems
courts are not required to produce collective opinions, not even
majority opinions. Dissenting judges may express their own reasons
for concurring or dissenting with the majority decision. The court
äs such does not state "its" reasons.
In most Western democracies legislatures follow the second Sys-
tem. Preambles (that is the technical name for that part of a Sta-
tute in which the reasons of the legislature for that Statute are
given) are extremely rare in Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Switzer-
land, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. And
even in the Netherlands, where a preamble is constitutionally re-
quired in every Act of Parliament, most preambles do not say much
more than that the Act is "desirable" or "necessary" (Waaldijk
1984: 410). Thus the members of the legislatures in these countries
are not required to reach or pretend consensus about the reasons
for an enactment. For those interested, no document containing the
reasons of (the majority of) the legislature is available.
However, some documents come close to belng guides to the rea-
sons of the legislatures, for although legislative decisions may
not be accompanied by Statements of reasons, legislative proposals
(Bills) generally are. In document-oriented cultures like the Ne-
therlands this is done in explanatory memoranda (which, later on,
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are supplemented by parliamentary debates). In oral cultures like
the United Kingdom the reasons of ehe proposers are flrst expressed
in parliamentary debates (which sometimes are supplemented by ex-
planatory memoranda). The reasons thus put forward by the proposers
of the enactment may persuade a majority to Support it. The same
reasons may (or may not, äs is the official doctrine in the United
Kingdom) later be used by judges and other Interpreters of the Sta-
tute. However, these reasons are never formally adopted by (a majo-
rity of) the legislature. In general it is unknown whether these
reasons represent the actual reasons of a majority of the legisla-
ture. Lengthy study of numerous concurring and dissenting opinions
expressed during parliamentary debates may be needed to discover
any consensus or dissent about the reasons for legislation. These
difficulties for the Interpreter emphasise how difficult it would
be for the legislature if it were required to produce a collective
"opinion" about the desirability or necessity of an enactment.
3. Statutes äs politlcal decisions.
Law-making is only one tool for a legislature to exert political
power. Giving reasons for that law-making can be used äs a separate
tool for influencing citizens, judges, etcetera.
Therefore, legislatures may be tempted to put forward other than
their actual reasons, or at least to tailor their reasoning to
other political aims than supporting the enactment concerned. In
particular, politicians may use legislative reasons for various
symbolic and ideological purposes. Rethorn (1976: 310-313) and Kin-
dermann (1979: 83-84), two West German authors, have pointed out
that preambles have been used very frequently both in Nazi Germany
and in East Germany, malnly for purposes of Propaganda, they claim.
The hypothesis may be put forward that preambles are mainly used by
lawgivers who are anxious to establish or reinforce their authori-
ty. Further evidence for this hypothesis may be found in many new
constitutions of the last two centuries, e.g. in France and (West)
Germany, (Rethorn 1976: 308), in major constitutional Acts of the
British Parliament (Erskine May 1983: 493) and in regulations and
directives of the Commission and the Council of the European Commu-
nities (by force of the duties to give reasons contained in the
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treaties establishlng these Communities, especially Article 190 of
the EEC-Treaty), all of which have preambles in them. As we have
seen, most ordinary Statutes enacted by legislatures with an esta-
blished authority in Western democracles do not contain preambles.
Of course (mls)use of preambles for various political purposes
is possible even when there is no requlrement to accompany Statutes
with preambles. However, the possibility of political misuse of
preambles, and especially the possibility that a legislature will
put forward other than its actual reasons, should make us sceptical
when considering any requirement for legislatures to give reasons.
The possibility of discrepancies between the real reasons and
the reasons given also exists where courts are required to give
reasons for their decisions. However, judges are less likely to be
tempted to put forward false reasons. This difference between jud-
ges and legislators will be partly explalned in the following para-
graph.
4. Statutes äs unlimiced decisions.
What use would a requirement to give reasons be, if any reason gi-
ven would be acceptable? None, it seems. The requirements to give
reasons for administrative and judicial decisions make sense, be-
cause these decisions and the reasons on which they are based may
be reviewed by (higher) authorlties on their conformity with rules
and principles of law. Simllarly, when the Dutch Supreme Court in-
troduced the requirement to give reasons for a parental refusal to
marry, this requirement only made sense because in the same deci-
sion the court ruled that such a refusal 1s only lawful if it is
not unreasonable (HR 4 June 1982, NJ 1983, nr. 32). In other words,
the - formal - requirement to give reasons is only useful.in rela-
tion to - material - rules outlawing particular (e.g. unreasonable
or discriminatory) reasons.
The problem then is that legislation is hardly subject to any
material rule: legislatures can lawfully legislate for any reason.
This is known in constitutional law äs the legislative supremacy or
sovereignty of parliament. And although in many countries inroads
on this supremacy have been made (notably in the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany, to a lesser extent in France and
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the Netherlands, and to a still very limited extent in the United
Kingdom), the rules contained in constitutions and international
texts set only very few limits to the powers of the legislatures.
There is not much "supra-legislative law" or "iibergesetzliches
Recht". Legislatures can still legislate for almost any reason.
The analogy with supreme courts is not complete, for although
supreme courts (just like supreme legislatures) are not subject to
any superior control, unlike supreme legislatures they are fully
subject to the body of law they are supposed to enforce.
This means that legislatures have hardly any focus for their
Statement of reasons, whereas judicial and administrative authori-
ties can focus their reasoning on the rules to which their deci-
sions and their reasons have to conform.
5. Statutes äs clustered decisions.
Most administrative and judicial decisions are concerned with one
"digital" point only (conviction, acquittal; annulment; granting,
refusing or withdrawing a licence; etcetera). This makes it pos-
sible to focus the reasoning on that one point. The reasoning can
be one line of argument with one conclusion: the actual decision.
On the contrary, most legislative decisions form a whole cluster
of provisions (primary rules, rules of enforcement, rules of proce-
dure, definitions, transitional provisions, etcetera). That makes
it very difficult for the reasoning to be focussed. When required
to state its reasons, a legislature therefore will either give only
general reasons for the general desirability or necessity of the
enactment, or it will try to develop a separate line of argument
for each and every (element of a) provision. Or alternatively, the
legislature will not know how to conform to the requirement to give
reasons, unless this requirement is made more specific.
6. Statutes äs continious decisions.
Two aspects may be distinguished in each legislative decision: (a)
the decision to enact the Statute concerned and (b) the Statute
which is enacted. Once the Statute is enacted, the decision to en-
act is only something which happened in the past. The Statute it-
self however has a continuous character: it is "always speaking"
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(at least from its commencement until its repeal).
The same distinction can be made in most administrative and ju-
dicial decisions too. However, there the continuous aspect of the
decision is less important, mainly because it will only be opera-
tive for the person concerned during a relatively small period.
The distinction has implications where reasons are concerned. At
the time of enactment the reasons for legislation may be supposed
to cover both the unique and the continuous aspect of the decision.
However, after a while the reasons for the continuous Statute may
Start to change; or, to be more precise, the facts and desires con-
stituing these reasons may change or even disappear. The wisdom
that people and societies and their Knowledge and desires, fre-
quently change, has even led to a Latin maxim about the relatlon-
ship between law and its reasons: cessante ratione legls cessat 1p-
sa lex (when, or where, the reason of a law ceases, the law itself
ceases). Opinions Vary äs to the degree to which this maxim is ap-
plicable to legislation and other forms of law (see Bennion 1984:
345-346). The maxim suggests that only the historical reasons for
enacting are relevant. It is a fact however, that the functions of
Statutes change over time, and that legislators take these changes
into account. The reasons for not repealing may well be very diffe-
rent from the historical reasons for enacting.
If it were required that the reasons for legislation should be
stated by the legislature, it would not suffice to state only the
reasons for every enacting event. The giving of reasons should then
be just äs continuous äs the Statutes themselves: every now and
again the (new) reasons for not repealing should be given.
If, on the other hand, the requirement to state reasons for le-
gislation were restricted to the reasons for enacting, many impor-
tant reasons for legislation (i.e. for not repealing existing Sta-
tutes) would still not be given.
7. The general theme in the preceding paragraphs is that there is
no clear fratnework, in which reasons for legislative decisions can
be given. It may be argued however, that such a framework is in the
process of developing and being developed· This is partly due to
the fact that legislation has become a frequent and regulär form of
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legal decision-making (such äs adjudication and administration have
been already for a longer tlme), and partly to the - related - gro-
wing concern among academic and other lawyers that legislation
should be ruled by law too.
As to the collective character of legislation it should be noted
that very many legislative decisions are in fact the decisions of
one single body: a ministerial department. Legislative assemblies
hardly ever "legislate"; they just give their (more or less in-
formed) consent to decisions of the administration. And so too, the
political character of legislation is fading: most legislative de-
cisions are merely "administrative".
At the same time the unlimited character of legislation is ever
more taken away by a growing number of supra-legislative rules:
constitutions, international treaties (especially in the fields of
human rights and economic and technical cooperation), decisions of
international bodies (especially those of the "supra-national" Eu-
ropean Communities), unwritten principles of proper legislation,
guidelines for legislative policy and "drafting", political Ideals
like deregulation, etcetera (Waaldijk 1985: 4-12). These bodies of
rules also make it possible to distinguish between the different
"decisions" contained in a clustered legislative decision. Thus,
the reasoning of legislatures (i.e. the ministerial departments),
rather than concentrating on the general desirability of the Statu-
te, can now focus on the conformity of specific provisions of the
Statute to specific supra-legislative rules. And this can be done
both at the time of enactment, and on every later occasion on which
the Statute, or one of its provisions, is challenged in parliament
or before a national or international court. On all these occasions
the responsible department can be required to explain why "its" de-
cisions do not contravene superior (legal or seml-legal) rules.
We may conclude that it is becoming less problematic to require
legislatures to state the reasons for their legislative decisions.
And thus, it becomes possible for legislative decisions to conform
to the same "rule of law" äs administrative and judicial decisions:
to be embedded in a System of rational argumentation for reasonable
decisions. That may even be desirable.
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